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addition, at counsels' request the Magistrate agreed to listen to the 
recordings [of the traffic stop]. On December 14, 2006, the State 
filed an additional response to the Motion and Livas responded on 
December 18, 2006. 
The Magistrate denied the Motion to Suppress on December 
27, 2006, in a written decision. 
On January 4, 2007, at 4:45 p.m., Livas filed a lengthy 
Motion and Memorandum to Reconsider challenging the 
Magistrate's evidentiary findings and rulings. On February 2, 2007, 
the court clerk scheduled the Motion to Reconsider to be heard 
February 16, 2007, less than one month before the six months 
would run. At the hearing on February 16, 2006, Livas indicated he 
may want to file an interlocutory appeal. After the hearing, the 
parties filed additional briefing. Livas filed additional material on 
February 23, 2007, twenty-one days before the six months would 
run, and the State responded on March 2, 2007, just twelve days 
before the six months would run. Furthermore, in his February 23, 
2007, brief at the end, Livas wrote as follows: 
In the event the Court denies this Motion for 
Reconsideration, and does not disturb its Order of 
December 27, 2007, denying Mr. Livas' Motion to 
Suppress, Mr. Livas requests that the Court stay this 
case in the event he determines to appeal the Court's 
ruling to the Disfrict Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 54.2. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Magistrate denied Livas' Motion on April 4, 2007, 
twenty-one days after the six month deadline. On May 2, 2007, 
pretrial was scheduled for June 22, 2007, and the trial set for July 
24, 2007. Livas moved to dismiss for a violation of his statutory 
speedy trial rights on May 24, 2007, and the Magistrate denied the 
Motion at oral argument on June 22, 2007. Livas entered a 
conditional guilty plea and this appeal followed. 
(R., pp.95-96.)' (Emphasis in original.) 
' For ease of reference, the state has attached as Appendices to this brief: the 
ROA, the minutes from all relevant hearings, the transcript from the magistrate's 
hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the district court's order on appeal. 
ISSUE 
Livas states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the District Court erred in affirming the decision of the 
Magistrate Court, which held that because Mr. Livas filed a Motion 
to Suppress, he effectively applied to postpone his trial, thereby 
waiving his right to a speedy trial as provided in Idaho Code 9 19- 
3501. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court, in its appellate capacity, correctly conclude that the 
magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by 
substantial evidence and that the magistrate's conclusion - that Livas' statutory 
right to a speedy trial was not violated -followed from those findings? 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 ldaho 255, 257, 
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings 
of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely 
reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. Id. 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded The Magistrate Court Properly 
Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Livas' Motion To Dismiss 
A misdemeanor case should be dismissed if not tried within six months of 
a defendant's not guilty plea, unless "good cause to the contrary is shown" or the 
trial was "postponed upon [the defendant's] application." I.C. § 19-3501(4). 
When a defendant who moves to dismiss his case pursuant to I.C. 5 19-3501(4) 
shows that trial was not postponed at his request, the burden then shifts to the 
state demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss the case. State 
v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 ldaho 29, 37, 921 P.2d 206, 215 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"[Glood cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the 
level of a legal excuse for the delay. Because there is not a fixed rule for 
determining good cause for delay of a trial, the matter is initially left to the 
discretion of the trial court." -,I35 ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citations 
omitted). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is 
subject to independent review on appeal. Id. Ultimately, "whether legal excuse 
has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. This 
correctly found that the magistrate's legal conclusion followed from its factual 
findings: 
The State did not file the motions, Livas did. Livas raised important 
challenges to the admissibility of the evidence and had he won the 
motions, most likely the case would have been dismissed. The 
Motion to Suppress and Motion for Reconsideration postponed the 
trial, not once but twice. Furthermore, in his Motion for 
Reconsideration, Livas actually asked the Magistrate to stay his 
criminal case if he should decide to appeal. 
By the time all the motions and supporting memoranda had 
been filed there were only twelve days before the six months would 
have run and the Magistrate's decision itself was not issued until 
twenty-one days after the six months had run. The Magistrate 
found that the delay was caused Livas' pretrial motions and that the 
amount of time the court took to resolve those motions was not 
excessive. This Court agrees. The need to resolve legitimate 
pretrial motions is "a substantial reason that rises to the level of a 
legal excuse for the delay." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho, 255, 260, 16 
P.3d 931, 936 (2000). 
The analysis of whether there was "good cause" is not 
simply a determination of who was responsible for the delay and 
how long the case has been pending. Rather, the analysis focuses 
upon the reason for the delay and whether there is "a substantial 
reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." In 
this case the trial was delayed beyond the six-month period 
because Livas filed important pretrial motions that may have 
resolved the case. By upholding the trial court's ruling that Livas' 
motions amounted to an application for postponement or "good 
cause" this does not affect a defendant's constitutional right to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence as suggested by Livas. It 
simply means that if the defendant does move to suppress or files 
pretrial motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert 
speedy trial as a sword. 
(R., p.99.) As noted by the district court, Livas' motions acted as his application 
for postponement but also as the reason for the delay. Comparing the Supreme 
Court's holding in State v. Young, 136 ldaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (ZOO?), that the 
state's legitimate, good faith attempt at an interlocutor appeal rose to the level of 
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1 Boise, Idaho, Friday, June 22,2007 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S  
3 
4 THE COURT: This is Case No. M0612194. We are here 
5 on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Ms. Points. We had a 
6 brief in chamber conference on the motion. We talked 
7 about the procedural history of the case. 
8 Ms. Points, I'll hear your argument. 
9 MS. POINTS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
1 0  As the Court is aware, this motion is brought 
11 pursuant to Idaho Code 19-3501, which provides that 
1 2  after the entry of a plea, there is six months in which 
1 3  to have the case tried, unless good cause is shown. And 
1 4  1 guess the issue here today is what constitutes good 
1 5  cause. 
1 6  In the briefmg, Your Honor, I have outlined a 
1 7  few cases where the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of 
1 8  Appeals have addressed the issue of what constitutes 
1 9 good cause, and I think those cases are very 
2 0 instructive. Those cases are State v. Clark and State 
2 1  v. Young. 
2 2 As the Court is likely aware, there is a 
2 3 Supreme Court case referred to as the Barker case, and 
2 4 that case considered factors in which a defendant could 
2 5 argue violation of speedy trial and cases where that's 
Page 4 
1 appropriate. The Idaho Supreme Court specifically found 
2 that -- there should not be consideration of the Barker 
3 factors in a State case, unless there is an illegal 
4 excuse established by the State in not bringing a case 
5 against the defendant. 
6 And I've also briefed in the memorandum, Your 
7 Honor, the duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with 
8 the State, not the defendant. 
9 The two cases that I've briefed, State v. 
1 0  Clark and State v. Young, the first was a case that is 
11 somewhat similar to ours in which there wassome court 
1 2  congestion, some court reasons for the trial not going 
1 3  within a six-month period of time, and the prosecution 
1 4  also argued that witnesses were not available. 
1 5  That went up to the Supreme Court, and they 
1 6  found that that was not a legal excuse. The defendant 
1 7  did not waive his speedy trial rights, and that did not 
1 8 constitute a legal excuse under the 19-3501. 
1 9  Again, in the State v. Young, this was a case 
2 0 that involved child sexual abuse, and the Court had 
2 1 granted a motion to suppress certain evidence that was 
2 2  quite telling of what had happened. And the State 
2 3 requested that they take an interlocutory appeal on 
2 4 that, and the Court granted that, which pushed the case 
2 5 back past the six months. 
v. Gilbert Livas 
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1 The Supreme Court held that that was a legal 
2 excuse, given the fact that in the event it was found 
3 that the evidence should not have been suppressed, and 
4 the defendant was acquitted, he could not then again be 
5 retried. Only that measure gave rise to a legal excuse. 
6 However, back to State v. Clark, witness availability, 
7 court congestion, things of that nature, do not 
8 constitute a legal excuse under the relevant statute. 
9 The statute gives more protection than does the U.S. 
1 0  Constitution and the State constitution. 
11 The factual record in the case, Your Honor, is 
12 that on September 14th of 2006, Mr. Livas filed a not 
1 3  guilty plea. That would start the clock of six months 
14 saying the Court should hold the trial by March 14th of 
1 5  2006. 
1 6  Quite rapidly, Mr.Livas filed a Motion to 
1 7  Suppress; and I won't hash out what the nature of that 
1 8  Motion to Suppress was, but at the pretrial conference, 
1 9  the same day the Motion to Suppress was filed, October 
2 0 loth, 2006, and the Court suggested that the court trial 
2 1 be vacated allowing him enough time to hear the Motion 
2 2 to Suppress. There was no notice of trial setting at -- 
2 3 issued after that time to timely set the court trial. 
2 4 The Motion to Suppress was heard, and on 
2 5 December 27th, 2006, the Court entered an order denying 
Page 6 
1 the Motion to Suppress. Within a week, we filed a 
2 Motion for Reconsideration, and that was held --that 
3 was heard on February 16th, 2007, still within 30 days 
4 of the six months. We could have had trial any time 
5 between the time the first trial was vacated and March 
6 14th of 2007, but there was no notice issued. 
7 Mr. Livas along this --during this case, has 
8 made every effort to move the case along expeditiously. 
9 As I'm sure you can see from the record, we've timely 
1 0  filed the Motion to Suppress, the Motion for 
11 Reconsideration within a week, and that was heard, 
1 2  accordingly to the court schedule. At no time during 
1 3  the court trial -- or during these proceedings, did the 
1 4  Court or the State inquire whether Mr. Livas intended to 
1 5  or wanted to waive his speedy trial rights or his rights 
1 6  under 19-3501. 
17 Nothing precluded the Court from issuing a 
1 8  notice of trial setting from the time first trial 
1 9  setting of vacated. In fact, Your Honor, it would have 
2 0 been most appropriate to issue a notice of trial setting 
2 1 after the first Motion to Suppress was denied. And at 
2 2 no time was a trial setting set. 
2 3 Nothing precluded the State from requesting 
2 4 that the Court issue a notice of trial setting that the 
2 5 matter be set within the time allowed under the statute. 
1 (Pages 3 to 6) 
J u n e  22, 2007 
State of Idaho v. Gilbert Livas 
3 (Pages 11 to 14) 
June 22, 2007 
' 
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1 this case. 
2 In Young, Your Honor, I think that that case 
3 does have some similarities, that there was a delay 
4 caused at the trial level by sorting out evidentiary 
5 issues, and that was good cause. And in that case, that 
6 delay was at the State's -- on the State's motion, that 
7 the State caused the procedural delay to hear the 
8 evidentiary issues and to take the interlocutory appeal. 
9 And even at the State's behest, that was good cause. 
1 0  In this case, you have the same kinds of 
1 1 delays, but the defendant's request is even more in 
1 2  favor of the State. We fall comfortably on the other 
1 3  side of the Young holding. In the Young holding, the 
1 4  bottom line is that good cause was found, Your Honor, so 
1 5  that case squarely supports the State. No problem to 
1 6  citing that case or having the Court look at that case 
1 7  atall. 
1 8  Your Honor, the defendant's constitutional 
1 9  speedy trial rights are -- you know, the Barker v window 
2 0 for part balancing, I believe is still intact. I mean, 
2 1 if we were to have some unreasonable delay for the next 
2 2 year because the State had every witness go on vacation 
2 3 for every court trial set from here on out, the Court 
2 4 would be free to dismiss on constitutional grounds, but, 
2 5 Your Honor, the State has not requested a continuance 
Page 12 
1 once in this case. The delay so far has been because 
2 the defendant has wanted to raise these issues. The 
3 issues have been heard, and now we're a little bit 
4 outside that timeframe. 
5 Your Honor, I think that it is pretty safe to 
6 say that the facts in this case indicate that legal 
7 excuse does exist. 
8 Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. In 19-3501, subsection 4, 
1 0  of that statute, the Court, unless good cause is shown, 
11 must order the dismissal if a defendant is charged with 
1 2  a misdemeanor, is not brought to trial within six months 
1 3  from the date he entered a plea of not guilty, and if 
1 4  the case has not been postponed upon his application. 
1 5  So clearly, Mr. Livas has not been brought to trial 
1 6  within six months of the entry of the plea. But 
1 7  effectively, the trial has been postponed upon his 
1 8  application. 
1 9  He may have -- I'm not sure if it is a 
2 0 constitutional right to bring a suppression motion. He 
2 1 certainly has a procedural right to bring a suppression 
2 2 motion when there's a constitutional violation alleged, 
2 3 but I'm not aware of any case law that extends or 
2 4 shortens the time -- hamstrings the State, essentially, 
2 5 under 19-3501, by the exercise of the defendant's 
Page 13 
1 procedural right to bring a motion. 
2 Defined otherwise, it would seem to me would 
3 open the door for defendants in all cases simply to file 
4 motions that had the effect of extending the proceeding 
5 beyond a defendant's speedy trial right, and then 
6 claiming the rights of speedy trial was violated. 
7 And while I appreciate that there are 
8 dishabille issues that needed be resolved, the State did 
9 not ask for a continuance. There was a trial date set 
1 0  well within the six-month period, and the only reason 
11 that it was reset was because the defendant filed a 
1 2  Motion to Suppress. 
1 3  And I agree that had that motion been 
1 4  resolved, and it was resolved within ample time to reset 
1 5  the defendant's trial within the six months, but the 
1 6  Motion to Reconsider was filed -- which necessarily 
1 7  requires additional time to be heard and to be briefed, 
18 and Judge Harrigfeld provided additional time for that 
1 9  to be heard and briefed. 
2 0 I don't think it's unusual or excessive where 
2 1 the last supplemental authority that was submitted by 
2 2 the State, I believe, on March 2nd of 2007, followed by 
2 3 a decision that was issued by Judge Harrigfeld on June 
2 4 30th -- I don't think that that's an extraordinary delay 
2 5 for the Court to cause in responding to a supplemental 
Page 1 4  
1 motion. 
2 And of course, by that time -- it is 
3 unrealistic to expect that the trial could have been set 
4 within two weeks after the last supplemental brief was 
5 allowed, I think. 
6 So, I mean, first of all, I'm not sure that 
7 the defense has reached the second prong of the inquiry 
8 that the trial wasn't delayed or postponed upon their 
9 application effectively. And I believe it was. And if 
1 0  1 were to find otherwise, I think that there is good 
11 cause given the delay and the fact that I haven't heard 
1 2  anything about prejudice. There has been no 
1 3  conversation about how this has affected the defendant's 
1 4  right to receive a fair trial. 
1 5  And I think for all of those reasons, I don't 
1 6  think that dismissal is appropriate under these 
1 7  circumstances. I am going to deny the motion, 
1 8  Ms. Points. 
1 9  Do you know where we are in terms of -- are we 
2 0 going to trial on the 24th of July? 
2 1 MS. POWTS: No. I anticipate that we will 
2 2 negotiate with the State. 
23  THE COURT: Okay. So --well, I'm going to leave 
2 4 it on for trial -- 
2 5 MS. POINTS: Okay. 
I 
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Case No. H0701013 
DECISION ON APPEAL 
This matter is before the Court as an Appeal kom the Magistrate's denial of a 
Motion to Suppress, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court heard oral argument on March 27, 2008, and the Court considered the 
matter l l l y  submitted on March 28,2008. 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court a f h s  the trial court's denial of the 
Motion to Suppress, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss. The Court 
remands for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 9, 2006, at approximately 2:50 a.m., Officer White, Boise Police 
Department, stopped Gilbert Livas Jr. for traveling 60 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. Livas 
was driving on Boise's outbound connector heading away from the downtown area. The 
Magistrate listened to the recording and found that as Officer White approached Livas' 
car, the following exchange took place:' 
Officer White: Hello Sir, do you have your driver's license and insurance? 
Livas: Yes, I do 
Livas: I need to tell you that I am deaf, ok so, I have to read lips, to talk to 
you. Here you go. 
I The file contains both a recording of the traffic stop, and a transcript of the recording. Both are attached 
to the Affidavit of Michelle R. Points dated October 10, 2006. Livas contested the completeness of the 
Banscript and, therefore, for the purpose of the Motion to Suppress, the Magiseate listened to the recording 
and did not read the transcript. 
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unjustifiably expanding the investigation of the initial traffic stop. The 
issue that this court is concentrating on is whether or not the expansion of 
the initial traffic stop by asking whether the defendant had anything to 
drink that night, and thereafter further investigating the defendant for 
driving under the influence, was an unlawful expansion of the initial stop? 
There is no issue as to the initial stop of the defendant. The 
Officer had probable cause to stop the defendant for violating the law in 
exceeding the posted speed limit. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a "seizure" even if the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the detention quite. brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653, (citations omitted). When such a stop is 
made for purposes of investigating possible criminal 
activity, it must be based upon specific articulable facts 
which warrant a suspicion that the person detained has been 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. (citations 
omitted) 
State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503,927 P.2d 863. The parties are in agreement . 
. . the defendant was legally stopped for violating the posted speed limit. 
The Court in Reed goes on and states: 
The elements of detention, if reasonably prolonged after the 
justification for the detention has dissipated, may become 
an unreasonable seizure which is objectionable under the 
fourth amendment. Id. at 505. 
The Idaho Appellate Court goes on and defines reasonable suspicion as 
follows: 
The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than 
probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the 
part of the officer. State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 
(Ct.App. 1991) 809 P.2d 522. 
The issue this court believes is before it is whether or not the officer had 
more than speculation or instinct causing his expansion of the stop. The 
issue this Court is focusing on is well laid out in State v. Gutierrez, 137 
Idaho 647 (Ct.App. 2002) which states: 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an 
investigative .detention "must be temporary and last no 
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
(citations omitted) Id at 65 1. 
The defendant, through extensive briefing and through oral argument, has 
not at any time claimed that the officer expanded the time of the stop by 
asking the defendant if he had anything to drink that night. The officer 
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additional time to be heard and to be briefed, and Judge Hanigfeld 
provided additional time for that to be heard and briefed. 
I don't think it's unusual or excessive where the last supplemental 
authority that was submitted the State, I believe, on March 2nd of 2007, 
followed by a decision that was issued by Judge Hanigfeld on June 3oth - 
21 don't thi& that that's an extraordinary delay for the Court to cause in 
responding to a supplemental motion. 
And of course, by that time - it is unrealistic to expect that the trial 
could have been set within two weeks after the last supplemental brief was 
allowed, I think. 
So, I mean, first of all, I'm not sure that the defense has reached 
the second prong of the inquiry that the trial wasn't delayed or postponed 
upon their application effectively. And I believe it was. And if I were to 
find otherwise, I think that there is good cause given the delay and the fact 
that I haven't heard anything about prejudice. There has been no 
conversation about how this has affected the defendant's right to receive a 
fair trial. 
And I think for all of those reasons, I don't think that dismissal is 
appropriate under these circumstances. I am going to deny the motion[.] 
On July 24, 2007, Livas entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to 
appeal. On July 31,2007, Livas appealed regarding the denial of his Motion to Suppress, 
Motion to Reconsider, and Motion to Dismiss. On November 14, 2007, Livas filed his 
Appellant's Brief. On December 27,2007, the State responded and on January 10, 2008, 
Livas replied. The Court heard oral argument March 27,2008. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is being heard as an appellate proceeding. I.R.C.P. 83(b). Review of 
the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the 
findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of Iaw. 
Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486,488-489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-1238 (2006) (citing 
Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's 
findings of fact in a court tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the 
judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Lindgren v. Martin, 130 
Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. 
Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). 
The Magistrate actually signed the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration on March 30,2007, and 
the clerk filed the Order on April 4,2007. 
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committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852, 11 P.3d 44, 
48 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Livas concedes the stop was proper. However, he 
contends that the officer expanded the scope of the investigation by asking him how 
much he had been drinking. 
However, an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 
926, 931 (Ct.App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 
(Ct.App. 2000). Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully 
tailored Lo its underlying justification. Id. In this regard, a lawful detention can become 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission 
which justified the initial detention. Muehler v. Mina, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005); Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial 
purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's rights. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 
362, 17 P.3d at 306 (citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). 
If it does not lengthen the stop, an officer may ask questions unrelated to the purpose of 
the traffic stop and may perform a dog sniff of a car. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363, 17 
P.3d 307; see also State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005). 
As stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968), the determination of whether 
an investigative'detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry--(l) "whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception" and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Here, Livas does 
not contest the basis for the stop. Thus, the Court need address only the second prong of 
this inquiry, whether Officer White's questioning was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the traffic stop. 
The purpose of the stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated. Parkinson, 
135 Idaho at 362,17 P.3d 306. As the Court of Appeals recognized: 
[AJny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances, which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The 
officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop 
may--and often do--give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of 
inquiry and further investigation by an officer. 
State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613,798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct.App.1990). 
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The Ninth Circuit also recently considered an argument similar to that advanced 
by Livas - that expanded questioning must be supported by separate reasonable 
suspicion. United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9'h Cir. 2007). In that case, the Ninth 
Circuit held that, so long as the traffic stop was not prolonged by the questions, expanded 
questioning during a traffic stop need not be supported by separate reasonable suspicion. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Magistrate properly denied the Motion to 
Suppress and affirms the Magistrate. Likewise, Livas raised no new arguments on 
reconsideration and the Court affirms the Magistrate's denial of reconsideration. 
B. The Magistrate properly denied the Motion to Dismiss. 
Livas also contends the Magistrate, the Honorable Judge Michael Reardon, 
improperly denied his Motion to Dismiss. He argues that the Magistrate improperly 
found good cause for his trial being scheduled four months beyond the six month 
statutory period. Livas moved to dismiss for a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights 
and the Magistrate denied his Motion. Livas does not raise a constitutional challenge to 
the delay. 
/" // 
The relevant facts are undisputed. On September 14, 2006, Livas pled'.*ot guilty 
and demanded his trial be set within the statutory speedy trial period, i.e., prior to March 
14, 2007. A jury trial was scheduled for November 6, 2006, well within his speedy trial 
rights and a pre-trial conference set for October 10,2006. 
On October 10, 2006, Livas moved to suppress all of the evidence. Livas gave 
notice that his Motion would be heard November 29, 2006, and his memorandum in 
support was 15 pages long. 
On November 16, 2006, in chambers with all counsel present, the trial court reset 
the trial to begin December 12, 2006, again well within his speedy trial rights. The State 
filed its opposition to the Motion on November 20, 2006. On November 29, 2008, the 
date originally set forthe evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the parties met 
in chambers, and the court reset the evidentiary hearing to December 11, 2006, the day 
before the scheduled trial. 
At the same meeting, the Magistrate vacated the trial. There is no record as to 
why the court vacated the trial or why he rescheduled the hearing. However, it is clear 
that the trial, originally set for November 6, 2006, and reset to December 12, 2006, would 
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the prosecution to demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss action. LC. 
$ 19-3501; State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 921 P.2d 206, pet. for rev. den. 
(1996). LC. 5 19-3501(4) provides in relevant part as follows: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the 
prosecution or indictment to be dismissed . . . 
*** 
(4) [i]f a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial 
has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within 
six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty 
with the court. 
On September 14,2006, Livas pled not guilty and demanded a speedy trial. Thus, 
statutorily, his trial should have been held before March 14, 2007. Therefore, because 
Livas' trial was not held within the six month period, the trial court was required to 
dismiss Livas' prosecution unless there was "good cause" shown for the delay, or Livas' 
actions caused his trial to be postponed. Whether there was an infringement of a 
defendant's right to speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 
Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The Court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, the Court 
exercises free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id. 
Under LC. 5 19-3501, criminal defendants are given additional protection beyond 
what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 
16 P.3d at 934. Idaho Code Section 19-3501 mandates that, unless the state can 
demonstrate "good cause" for a delay greater than six months, the court must dismiss the 
case. "[G]ood cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a 
legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. "Thus, the ultimate 
question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination 
upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. 
The analysis should not focus on who caused the delay. Rather, the analysis should focus 
upon the reason For the delay. Id. 
In addition to the reason for the delay, the Court may consider the following 
factors insofar as they bear on the suficiency or strength of the reason for the delay: (1) 
the length of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and 
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8,27 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 
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Livas argues he did not request that the Magistrate postpone the trial; the Magistrate did 
so sua sponte after Livas moved to suppress evidence. Livas asserts that the Magistrate's 
ruling amounts to the proposition that "if a defendant brings a motion to suppress (or any 
pretrial motion for that matter), that defendant effectively waives his right to speedy 
trial." Livas argues that opting to exercise one right does not equate to a waiver of 
another. While Livas argues that he is being asked improperly to choose between 
exercising a constitutional right to move to suppress evidence for an alleged violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and exercising his statutory right to speedy trial, that is not true. 
The Court finds that Livas' Motion clearly caused the delay in setting his trial. 
The State did not file the motions, Livas did. Livas raised important challenges to the 
admissibility of the evidence and had he won the motions, most likely the case would 
have been dismissed. The Motion to Suppress and Motion for Reconsideration postponed 
the trial, not once but twice. Furthennore, in his Motion for Reconsideration, Livas 
actually asked the Magistrate to stay his criminal case if he should decide to appeal. 
By the time all the motions and supporting memoranda had been filed there were 
only twelve days before the six months would have run and the Magistrate's decision 
itself was not issued until twenty-one days after the six months had run. The Magistrate 
found that the delay was caused by Livas' pretrial motions and that the amount of time 
the court took to resolve those motions was not excessive. This Court agrees. The need 
to resolve legitimate pretrial motions is "a substantial reason that rises to the level of a 
legal excuse for the delay." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,260, 16 P.3d 93 1,936 (2000). 
The analysis of whether there was "good cause" is not simply a determination of 
who was responsible for the delay and how long the case has been pending. Rather, the 
analysis focuses upon the reason for the delay and whether there is "a substantial reason 
that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." In this case, the trial was delayed 
beyond the six-month period because Livas filed important pretrial motions that may 
have resolved the case. By upholding the trial court's ruling that Livas' motions 
amounted to an application for postponement or "good cause," this does not affect a 
defendant's constitutional right to challenge the admissibility of evidence as suggested by 
Livas. It simply means that if the defendant does move to suppress or files pretrial 
motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert speedy trial as a sword. 
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00099 
The Court shares the Magistrate's concern that following Livas' reasoning, 
defendants could simply to file motions that had the effect of extending the proceedings 
beyond a defendant's statutory speedy trial right, and then claim his speedy trial right was 
violated. Surely a defendant cannot be allowed to artificially extend the proceedings 
prior to trial and then move for dismissal because the State and the court did not provide 
a trial within the required time frame. 
Therefore, the Court affirms the Magistrate's Order denying Livas' Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis there was good cause for the delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court affirms the trial court's denial of the Motions to 
Suppress, Reconsider and Dismiss. The Court remands for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 1' day of April 2008. 
h e +  
Cheri C. Copsey I 
District Judge 
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